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There is a serious threat that ill-considered government support for expanding legal means of 
controlling access to information for the purpose of extracting private economic rents is resulting 
in the “over-fencing of the public knowledge commons” in science and engineering. Such a new 
“tragedy of the commons” would bring adverse long-run consequences for future welfare gains 
through technological progress, and re-distributional effects further disadvantaging the present 
economically less advanced countries of the world.  
Radical legal innovations in intellectual property protection that seriously jeopardize the 
effective conduct of open, collaborative science have been introduced by the little noticed 
European Database Directive of March 1996. This initiative forms an emblematic and 
substantively significant aspect of the broader set of transformations in intellectual property rights 
institutions that have been initiated in response to the economic ramifications of rapid progress in 
digital information technologies. The EC Directive poses numerous contentious issues in law and 
economics that will create ambiguities for business and non-profit activities in this area for years 
to come. The terms on which those issues are resolved will materially affect the costs and 
organizational feasibility of scientific projects that are of global reach and importance, especially 
those that depend heavily upon the collection, management and analysis of large volumes of 
observational data that cannot be regenerated.  This paper sets out the economic case for the 
effectiveness of open, collaborative research, and the forces behind the recent, countervailing 
rush to strengthen and expand the scope of intellectual property rights protection. Focusing upon 
innovations in copyright law and the sui generis protection of hitherto unprotected content, it 
documents the genesis and analyzes the economic implications of the EC’s Database Directive, 
and related legislative proposals (H.R. 3125, H.R. 354 and H.R. 1858) in the US. Several modest 
remedial proposals are advanced to mitigate the adverse impact of “the digital technology 
boomerang” upon open science.   
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The Digital Technology Boomerang: 
New Intellectual Property Rights Threaten Global “Open Science” 
By 
Paul A. David 
 
Prologue: Digital Technology and the Potentialities for Global Scientific Collaboration 
The explosive developments that currently are transforming computer-mediated electronic 
communications most certainly will impinge in various ways upon the organization and conduct 
of scientific and engineering research. The emergence of new, high-bandwidth digital networks 
linking massive data storage and distributed parallel processing computing facilities is 
continuing the amazing fall in the marginal costs of information goods. This revolution touches 
everything from the availability of electronic working papers and journal publications, and 
specialized dynamic database services, to the prospective growth of an upgraded Internet that 
will support enhanced information search, filtering and retrieval services, virtual laboratory 
environments, and remote shared access to large experimental research facilities.  
 
These tools have the potential to profoundly alter the way that normal science research projects 
are organized, funded and carried out during the 21
st century. The recent completion of the first 
phase of the collaborative Human Genome Project is perhaps a harbinger of things to come. But, 
whether that potential will be fully realized is not a certainty, not even a “virtual” certainty. 
There is no question that the technological feasibilities of real-time distant collaborations, 
involving the sharing of both physical and data resources on a global scale, are in the process of 
being greatly expanded. Nor can one doubt that this is creating an enormous capacity for the 
mobilization and expansion of global scientific and technical resources which might be focused 
upon providing the knowledge base necessary to address many of the world’s pressing economic 
and social problems. Yet, a number of worrisome countervailing institutional developments are 
underway, and these already have become noticeable in the modifications being made in the 
legal protection of intellectual property. 
    2 
Because these institutional innovations, as I shall suggest, are reactive in some considerable 
degree to the impacts of the technological innovations associated with the digital revolution, 
there is no compelling reason to suppose that they are self-limiting. But, if the already apparent 
movement to expand and strengthen legal protection of intellectual property rights is permitted to 
proceed unchecked, a real danger lies ahead – and not so far ahead as might be supposed. We 
really do not know how much further the current rush toward privatization of scientific and 
technological knowledge can go before it starts to seriously undermine the inherited structure of 
fragile conventions and institutions that support cooperative research activities, thereby setting in 
motion the contraction of the global domain of open scientific inquiry – that remarkable realm of 
human endeavors to which the philosopher Michael Polanyi attached the designation: “The 
Republic of Science.”
 The situation of the latter territory in relation to that of the other principal 
modes of organization of scientific inquiry in the modern world is schematically described by 
Figure 1: the domain of the Republic of Science extends throughout those regions in which 
publicly funded research is carried on in general conformity with the norms of “open science,” 




It is upon this troubling prospect that I want to focus attention. This World Bank Annual 
Conference on Development Economics (Paris, 26 June 2000) was told by President Wolfenson 
in his opening remarks that it should attend to issues involving technology, as these often will be 
crucial in discussing alternative paths to development. Professor Sen then reminded us that 
global exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge historically have played a powerful 
role in advancing understanding of the human condition, and not only in progress as gauged by 
the material conditions of everyday life. From Minister Herfken we heard a persuasive argument 
that providing access to assets is critical in the design of strategies for growth, especially 
strategies that would prove effective also in improving the well-being of the poorest members of 
society. Surely “knowledge” about scientific and technological matters constitute a class of 
assets for which that proposition also holds true. This is so especially because knowledge is a 
                                                            
1 On the nature and historical origins of “open science,” see, e.g., Dasgupta and David (1987, 1994); David (1998).     3 
peculiar kind of asset – an asset that can be possessed, enjoyed and efficiently exploited – so 
long as access to it is not curtailed by being made into a property subject to private ownership.  
 
One implication that can be drawn from the foregoing simple truths is this: development 
economists ought to be concerned to analyze the impacts that alternative policy 
recommendations would have for the provision of access to reliable knowledge by members of 
the world’s poor societies, as well as by the rich. Rather than considering only the impact upon 
research aimed at meeting the needs of today and tomorrow, development economists ought to 
take the long view. They should ask how the resulting conditions of access and information 
exchange will bear upon the pursuit of knowledge of the kind that is particularly likely to be 
useful in solving the problems that will be confronting our children’s generation, and their 
children’s generation. It is within just this context that I believe it is warranted to draw greater 
attention to the problematic nexus that has been formed between the digital technology 
revolution and the transformations taking place in intellectual property rights.  
 
Boomerang – the Tool and the Metaphor  
Technological innovation emerges within the context of a large and complex system, and the 
character of its effects upon economic development and growth also are shaped by systemic 
interdependences of equal complexity. Non-linear dynamical systems, as is well known from 
formal analysis of their properties, are capable of generating a wide variety of surprising 
behaviors. Such considerations prompted the subtitle chosen for this paper, for the story of the 
“digital technology boomerang” offers a vivid illustrative exemplification of the importance – if 
one wants to avoid perverse outcomes – of adopting a systems-analysis approach to setting 
policies for science, technology and economic development.  
  
The boomerang we all know in actuality is a remarkable creation of Aboriginal Australian 
ingenuity: a curved wooden tool devised for hunting. My allusion to it in the sub-title of this 
paper, therefore, is wholly metaphorical: I suggest that when the effects of modern digital 
information and communications technologies are considered from the standpoint of the global 
communities engaged in scientific research, ICTs can be likened in some respects to a    4 
“boomerang.” The peculiarly interesting property of the artifact in question lies in its propensity 
(when properly thrown) to return to the origin point of its trajectory, should it miss its intended 
target. This proves quite handy, because it permits the skilled user armed with only one such 
projectile to make several attempts in reasonably close succession to stun small game at a 
distance. But the same property also means that failure to pay close attention to the path of the 
boomerang’s flight is quite likely to bring the launcher, or those standing close by, a sharp knock 
on the head. 
 
The boomerang’s aerodynamic qualities in this regard make it a particularly suitable metaphor 
for the larger class of clever human contrivances that harbor the potential to react back, visiting 
injury upon those who have launched them. Even the indirect, curving nature of its return path to 
the launch point is apposite to the emerging situation that I wish to discuss on this occasion, as 
will soon become apparent. This metaphor is meant to fix your attention upon a number of recent 
developments in the statutory protection of novel forms of intellectual property. Although these 
legal innovations have been received in some quarters as essentially innocuous, if not salutary, in 
my view they may turn out to gravely injure the conduct of open science – an enterprise 
generally acknowledged to hold enormous potential for improving the well-being of people all 
around the world. 
 
I am referring, in particular, to the indirect repercussions in the international regime of copyright 
protections that have followed in the wake of the recent, spectacular advance in information 
technologies. Although indirect, largely unanticipated – and too little noticed in the midst of the 
concerns raised over the patenting of transgenic organisms and genetic material – these legal 
sequelae of the digital technology revolution certainly are altering parts of the institutional 
infrastructure that has been supporting the pursuit of reliable and useful knowledge through open 
collaboration in scientific research. 
 
The particular problem upon which I want to concentrate here is not so simple, inasmuch as 
mastering its details entails conversations with intellectual property lawyers, and such 
conversations never are simple. Yet, it is possible for me to begin by stating its generic features 
in the following, reasonably simple terms (summarized by Figure 2). Knowledge is not an    5 
ordinary commodity; it has several properties that economists identify as those characterizing the 
general class of “public goods.”
2 As is well known, competitive markets cannot be relied upon to 
perform well in allocating resources to the production and distribution of commodities that have 
public goods properties. There are knowledge “spillovers” from discoveries, inventions and the 
process of scientific research itself, and still others from transactions involving information 
goods; these spillovers inhibit the ability of private investors to appropriate fully the economic 
benefits created by their investments in such activities.  
 
A variety of market and non-market institutional mechanisms may be deployed to address the so-
called “appropriability problem,” and, typically, several among these are found to be deployed 
simultaneously by modern states, in order to encourage the provision of public goods in the 
shape of scientific and technological knowledge. Some years ago, in another conference 
presentation to the World Bank, I referred to the three principal institutional devices as “the three 
P’s”: public Patronage, state Procurement (or, alternatively Production), and the legal exclusive 
ownership of (intellectual) Property.
3 The term Patronage stands here for the institutional 
arrangements for awarding publicly or charitably funded prizes, research grants based on the 
submission of competitive proposals for scientific peer review, and other subsidies to private 
individuals and organizations engaging in discovery and invention – in exchange for full public 
disclosure of their findings. “Patronage” characterizes the pursuit of open scientific inquiry and 
is the dominant institutional and social mode of organization associated with the conduct of 
academic research in the democratic societies of the West. 
 
Now the main point about “the Three P’s” that needs to be appreciated in the present connection 
is that none among them offers a solution that is “best” in all respects; each exhibits some special 
deficiencies as well as some specific virtues in its effects upon resource allocation. In the case of 
the application of the Property solution to the production of information goods, one can review 
                                                            
2 The three generally recognized properties are: (1) non-rival possession, which is made possible by the “perfect 
expansibility” of ideas; (2) low marginal cost of reproduction and distribution which makes it more difficult to 
exclude others from gaining access to them; (3) substantial fixed costs of original production. See section 4, below 
for further discussion.  
3 See David (1993), esp. pp. 226 ff. On the connection between patronage institutions and the historical emergence of 
open science, see, e.g., David (1998). Patronage contrasts most immediately with Procurement, which is associated 
with governmental contracting (or direct production) arrangements, generally, and for performance of scientific 
research in particular.     6 
the virtues, and the “vices” or defects of granting copyrights in the summary form that is 
presented by Figure 3. It is apparent that while the problem of extracting economic rents from 
the stock of knowledge is effectively addressed by the clever social device of awarding private 
ownership rights, governing the practical, commercial uses to which already existing knowledge 
may be put, the property solution tends to constrain the scientific application of existing 
knowledge to generate and verify the reliability of new knowledge. In contrast, an open science 
regime, of the sort that the Patronage solution would support, is most favorable for rapid stock 
expansion of the stock of knowledge, but interferes with exploiting the latter for economic profit.  
 
To obtain both rapid production and distribution of public goods in the form of scientific and 
technological knowledge, and to elicit the amount of investment needed in translating new 
knowledge into a rapid pace of economic welfare-enhancing innovation, it therefore is necessary 
to devise a system in which these distinct institutionalized mechanisms are kept working 
properly in conjunction with one another. In other words, the task of science and technology 
policy for economic development may be seen to be that of achieving and maintaining the right 
balance in the joint deployment of the institutional devices just discussed (see Figure 4a).  
 
Recently, however, the opportunities and disruptive effects created by technological change itself 
have set in motion economic and political pressures that are tending to unbalance the innovation 
systems of many of the world’s economies by placing greater and greater reliance  on the 
“property” solution (see Figure 4b). The “un-balancing” effect is to be seen within the regime of 
intellectual property in the nature of the additions made to the ever-widening, and increasingly 
dubious range of applications found for established principles of patent, copyright and trade 
secrecy law. But it also is manifest in the creation of quite novel sui generis legal protections for 
business investments involving information-goods, which in some cases have departed radically 
from established principles. Recent initiatives to establish legal protection of databases provide a 
case in point, the specific of which will be considered shortly. 
 
But, at the overall innovation system level, too, imbalances are appearing as a consequence of 
the strong and persisting policy consensus that presently favors subsidies for national industrial 
development in the form of monopoly rights to the exploitation of new knowledge. The problem    7 
is not so much with the intellectual property rights mechanism itself, which although imperfect, 
has been found to work well enough when it comes to stimulating private investment in the 
exploitation of commercial opportunities based upon existing scientific and engineering 
knowledge.
4 What is more problematic, especially for the long run, is the continuing 
encroachment upon the domain of public information through the efforts to find new ways to 
privatize old knowledge, and efforts to devise stronger and more extensively enforced property 
rights with which to appropriate the benefits of new knowledge.  
 
So much for this introductory, capsule sketch of the generic and necessarily rather abstract 
features of the situation that has developed. Now I must try to indicate briefly, but in 
considerably more specific terms, one particular set of issues that connects the present trajectory 
of the evolving legal protections accorded to intellectual property with the future vitality of the 
global communities engaged in open science research.  
 
The current acceleration of the process of modifying statutory provisions for the protection of 
copyrights to better adapt them to the realities of the new technological milieu, has been set in 
motion by the astounding scientific and engineering achievements in digital computation and 
telecommunications. But, it should be recalled that publicly funded research groups in the 
international basic science communities historically have played pioneering roles in launching 
the digital revolution.
5 Therefore, what strikes me as being particularly ironic is that the likely 
effects of the reactions triggered in the intellectual property rights regime are of a kind so 
inimical to the health of other, long-standing practices and institutional arrangements for the 
exchange of information and data. Not by accident, however, the latter arrangements are the very 
ones that remain critically important for the continuing advancement of scientific knowledge.  
 
Consequently, the digital revolution’s unexpected legal side effects could vitiate the direct 
economic benefits that enhanced information and communications technology (ICT) otherwise 
might have been expected to provide to the international research community. That untoward 
                                                            
4 It is true, of course, that consumers of the innovative goods and services that are provided under these 
arrangements will usually bear some burden in the form of the higher prices that monopoly-holders’ may extract, 
 so long as they enjoy their temporary freedom from the competition of imitators. But this already is widely 
acknowledged, and so does not require the same attention as the issue upon which this paper is focused.     8 
outcome would deliver the strong “negative feedback” in the final stage of the causal circuit that 
is diagrammed in Figure 5, tracing in summary form the flight path of “the digital boomerang.” 
Will the mode of scientific inquiry that was responsible in great measure for the technological 
foundations of the modern information revolution thus receive a collective “knock on the head” – 
through the agency of their own technical creations? Yes, quite possibly, especially if we are 
inattentive to the path along which the digital technology boomerang appears to be moving. 
 
Sources of the Present Passion for “Property”– and the Resulting “Digital Dilemma” 
The swing of the policy pendulum in the US and other highly advanced economies towards more 
extensive reliance upon strengthened patent and copyright protection for innovations, part of 
which has been the portrayal of these legal provisions as crucial for eliciting private investment 
in invention and commercialization of new products, has received impetus from a number of 
distinct sources: 
 
  First it was in some measure a defensive reaction to the emergence during the 1980's of 
intensified global competition from new producers who had acquired surprising technical 
capabilities.  
 
Second, some added momentum was gained from undertakings on the part of fiscally 
straightened governments during the 1990's to cut expenditures by transferring to the private 
sector a range of data production and information distribution activities that formerly were 
publicly provided. 
 
A third factor has been the rise of venture financing for new technology-based start-up 
companies, and the role that the existence of a portfolio of patents came to play in that context. 
Intellectual property is seen to signal both creative scientific and engineering competence, and 
the existence of a useful impediment to the rapid entry of competition into the market niche 
targeted by the new enterprise. Not only venture capitalists and business managers are attracted 
by these commercial advantages; in the US and Western Europe the more entrepreneurially 
inclined academic scientists and engineers increasingly are found seeking patents or copyrights 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ee, e.g., National Research Council (1999) for one recently documented part of this history.     9 
for their discoveries and inventions. Indeed, recent changes in government policy affecting the 
technology licensing of activities of universities and public institutes have been encouraging this 
new trend. 
 
Fourth, behind much of the impetus to adapt inherited regimes of copyright protection for use in 
the new technological environment of digital coding and electronic data transmission and 
copying, one can discern strong economic interests seeking to contain the disruptive effects upon 
traditional business models in the publishing industries, as well as to facilitate the commercial 
exploitation of these new digital technologies.  
 
Fifth, and surely most significantly in recent years, in fields such as biomedicine, information 
technologies and telecommunication network services, the rapid pace of advance of discovery 
and invention has heightened the drive on the part of business concerns to find more effective 
mechanisms of protection against the profit-destroying entry of “copy-cat competitors.” This 
reflects the fact that innovative commodities in those fields tend to be characterized by the 
combination of high fixed costs of development with very low unit costs of reproduction, 
rendering the position of the lead innovator especially perilous if others can simply copy and 
replicate their products.  
 
Statutory modifications of the intellectual property regime are thus seen by many as essential if 
the new technical capabilities for electronic network distribution of digitized information are not 
to be crippled by an obsolescent institutional infrastructure, such as the protection of copyright 
that has evolved from the grants of monopoly privileges made to printers in the era of 
Guttenberg.
6 IPR innovations generally are being directed towards facilitating the continued 
workings of markets in the age of electronic publishing and distribution of entertainment 
products (music and video); and towards providing incentives for more private investment in 
developing convenient means for consumers to access the contents of digital message streams. 
 
                                                            
6 On the historical evolution of copyright protections, see, e.g., David (1994) and references therein.    10
Nevertheless, a transformation of business models is now underway, induced by the prospects of 
a world of negligible information transmission and copying costs that daily is becoming more 
and more of a reality. The same prospects have strengthened the commercial impetus behind the 
development of countervailing techniques for preventing “piracy” – not by relying upon the legal 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, but instead by application of fast and cheap methods 
for data encryption and decryption that are being made possible by advances in digital 
computing. As a result of these two reactive trends, we may be moving towards a quite different 
state of affairs, one in which the current rush to tighten the copyright regime will come to be 
perceived as a serious mistake, because its consequences were antithetical to the development of 
new and profitable business opportunities.
7  
 
The phrase “the digital dilemma”
8 lately has begun to be applied in referring to the challenge 
posed by the need not only to accomplish this supply-side task, but also to do so without 
seriously sacrificing the economic interests of the ultimate users of data and information. The 
newly augmented, fully digital information infrastructure – comprising computer networks, the 
integrated set of technologies that constitute the World Wide Web, and the distributed libraries 
of information in digital form – is at once a remarkably powerful medium for publishing, 
distributing and controlling information, and the world’s largest reproduction facility. It has the 
potential to enormously improve access to information, and, at the same time it affords 
technological means of inhibiting access in ways that were never before practical. 
 
In discussions about how a proper balance between those effects might be managed through 
changes in intellectual property institutions, it is well recognized that it may not be possible to 
steer a course that avoids winding up with one or the other of the classic policy mistakes. On the 
one side, there is the risk of not leaving sufficient profit incentives for commercial producers of 
novel information goods and services; whereas, on the other side, there is the danger that society 
                                                            
7 On the possibilities for publishers actually to enhance profits by permitting and even facilitating free sharing of 
information goods among socially connected producer- and consumer-groups ( for which, it should be noted, 
academic scientific research networks provide a significant paradigm) see, e.g., Liebowitz (1985), and Bakos, 
Brynjolfsson and Lichtman (1999). These noteworthy contributions show that there is another side to the argument 
that digitally assisted “piracy” (unlicensed copying and redistribution) necessarily will be destructive to profitable 
publishing businesses. 
8 See National Research Council (2000), esp. pp. 1-3.    11
as a whole will have been burdened to an unnecessary degree by the inefficiencies in resource 
allocation that result from the legally sanctioned restraints placed on access to existing bodies of 
knowledge and information-goods. To be sure, there is in addition the vexed question of how the 
benefits from the induced innovations are to be shared. Is the societal need for more investment 
of the sort that will be forthcoming sufficiently great to justify giving intellectual property 
owners (particularly copyright-holders) the unrestricted power to charge whatever prices they 
wish? Should they thus be allowed to shift in their favor the distribution of whatever incremental 
producer and consumer surpluses have been created commercializing the innovation?  
 
The essential nature of the “trade-offs” between opposing economic interests that currently 
animates these questions is not new. Indeed, it has been aired thoroughly in the long history of 
policy debates over the benefits and costs of creating temporary intellectual property monopolies 
in order to encourage investment in commercially-oriented innovation activities. Yet, those 
national and international debates have been much preoccupied with patent issues; and even in 
the past and recent discussions of “the digital dilemma,” relatively little attention has been 
devoted to the ways in which the protection of intellectual property rights in the digital age may 
obstruct shared access to reliable and up-to-date information and data, and thereby seriously 
impede the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge. As a consequence of the 
construction of novel and potentially legal rights in intellectual property, and the encouragement 
of public and quasi-public institutions in making use of these to attract private sector funding as a 
way of meeting the high first-costs of making digitized archives available on electronic 
networks, larger and larger portions of the public data “commons” are being “enclosed” and 
transformed into private monopolies.  
 
The Case of the European Commission’s 1996 Database Directive  
The possibility that this unintended consequence of the digital technology revolution actually 
may sap the future vitality of the global public science system has been rendered worrisomely 
plausible by the case of the European Commission’s Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Databases, which was issued on March 11 1996. Even today, not many among those who should    12
be concerned actually are aware of the provisions that it requires the EU member countries to 
implement in their national statutes. 
 
 Briefly told, the Directive in effect established a new form of copyright in databases, one that 
(1) extends legal protection to content previously in the public domain and otherwise not 
copyrightable; (2) removes the distinction in the treatment of pre-existing expressive material 
and original expressions, permitting repeated renewals of protection on old database material; (3) 
permits virtually indefinite renewal of copyright protection for databases without requiring the 
substantial addition of new and original content; (4) abandons significant exclusions (such as 
exist in copyright law) for “fair use” – such as scholarly and literary criticism, use in scientific 
research, and education; (5) allows the database owner to set any licensing charges, or deny 
licenses to second parties wishing to extract any portion of the database; (6) omits provision for 
compulsory licensing or other remedies for abuse of market power when there are no practical 
means of third party regeneration of the contents and the database producer also holds copyrights 
on substantial portions of the contents; (7) jettisons the principle of “national treatment” 
(embraced by the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement), and explicitly threatens retaliatory 
denial of the protection of rights under EU law to foreigners whose countries do not subscribe to 
a new WIPO convention on database protection convention containing the same language as the 
Directive.  
 
A noteworthy aspect of the proceedings in the European Commission reflected the pre-
committed policy position advanced by the 1994 report on Europe and the global information 
society, prepared for the European Council by a “High-Level Group” under the chairmanship of 
Commissioner Martin Bangemann.
9 Intellectual property was embraced as central to the 
“Vision” of the Information Society projected in the Bangemann Report (1994: Ch. 3): 
“In this global information market place, common rules must be agreed and enforced by 
everyone. Europe has a vested interest in ensuring that protection of IPRs receives full 
attention and that a high level of protection is maintained.” 
 
                                                            
9 See Vaver (1999) for the broader context of European innovation policy approaches within which recent copyright 
directives have been developed.     13
This commitment sufficed in place of any inquiries as to whether recourse to sui generis 
copyright protection really was needed to stimulate European investment in database creation. 
How American database vendors had managed to surge so far ahead of Europe in this field, 
especially without the benefit of any special copyright protection, does not appear to have been a 
point on which the High-Level Group sought empirical enlightenment. Indeed, only the year 
before the draft Directive appeared, the US Supreme Court decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone 
(1991) had removed the remaining shreds of legitimacy draped around the argument that the 
producer of a database was entitled to the protection of copyright law on the basis of the sheer 
“sweat of the brow” effort invested in the activity of compilation, whether or not any 
significantly original contribution had been made to its contents.
10 Had the Commission 
subscribed to the proposition that economic policy measures should be “evidence-based,” and 
actually studied prevailing business practices, it would have been found that a wide variety of 
other appropriation devices other than intellectual property protection was available and was 
being successfully deployed by US database businesses.
11 Certainly the performance of the 
industry in the US after the Feist decision could not have lent support to the idea that sui generis 
protection was required to repair the damage done by that ruling. (See Table 1). But, to be fair to 
the Commission, their actions in this case were not aberrant: the entire legislative history of 
patent and copyright laws reflects a systematic disregard for either evidence or economic 
analysis. 
 
                                                            
10 The importance of the “sweat of the brow” argument for the legal protection of database investors has tended to be 
exaggerated. Both before and following the 1991 Feist ruling, copyright applied to the original selection, co-
ordination, and arrangement of data within a database; many defendants in the US therefore have been found liable 
for copyright infringement since 1991. It has been claimed by industry proponents of sui generis legislative 
protection that comprehensive electronically stored databases could not meet the standard set by copyright law, and 
such arguments conceivably may have influenced the EC’s High-Level Experts Group, members of the European 
Parliament, or advisers to the Council of Ministers. The comprehensive character of the compilation was said to 
imply that no “selection” was made by the database author; and the digital nature of the contents supposedly meant 
that rather than having been “arranged” by the compiler, the data were “arranged” by the user employing a search 
engine. But apart from cases involving a comprehensive electronically stored database consisting of telephone 
listing, US courts have not issued rulings that would confirm such fears. Most commercially valuable databases 
contain many linked fields, and the selection and arrangement of data in these is a sufficiently complex task to 
constitute some minimal level of creativity on the part of the author. US copyright law clearly prevents the 
wholesale copying of such (non-trivial) database structures, and thus affords their publishers significant protection 
even in the post-Feist era. 
  
11 See Maurer (1999): pp. 19-21.     14
In addition to initiating mimetic legislative proposals in the US Congress, the radical innovations 
introduced by the European Database Directive have posed a number of contentious issues in law 
and economics which are likely to create ambiguities for business and non-profit activities in this 
area for years to come. The ways in which these are resolved will materially affect the costs and 
organizational feasibility of carrying through some kinds of scientific projects that are of global 
reach and significance, especially those in the fields of geology, oceanography and climatology 
that depend heavily upon the collection, management and analysis of very large volumes of 
observational data.  
  
Thus, the specter before us is that of a new and different “tragedy of the commons.” It would be 
the tragic destruction of the public knowledge base necessary for scientific and technological 
research by “over-fencing” – the erection of artificial barriers whose purpose is the extraction of 
economic rents.
12 Unless systematic monitoring of such incursions can be organized on a global 
scale, and unless countervailing measures (such as compulsory licensing provisions) can be 
mounted quickly both at the national and international levels, the conduct of open, collaborative 
science – along with many of the benefits that flow from it, for the developed and the developing 
economies alike – may be seriously jeopardized. Ironically, and surely it would be a wicked and 
avoidable historical irony, serious damage could be done to the institutions and norms of open 
science by these unintended repercussions of the very same digital technologies to whose 
development public sector science itself contributed so crucially, and from which it otherwise 
might derive so much reinforcement.  
 
Some Modest Remedial Proposals – Toward Protecting Open Science in the Digital Age  
When considering the available courses of action to counter threats to the pursuit of knowledge 
arising from recent innovations intended to strengthen intellectual property protections, 
distinctions of two kinds help to simplify the discussion, although not the problems that need to 
be addressed. Firstly, there is an obvious difference between the altered terms and scope of 
                                                            
12 The “tragedy of the anticommons” is a phrase coined by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) to refer to the problem of 
excessive fragmentation of patent rights in the technological knowledge base for commercially-oriented innovation 
activities, which may inhibit private investment by imposing heavy transactions costs in assembling the necessary 
licensing rights. Use of this label is eschewed because the focus of concern here is on a different problem, involving 
obstacles to academic researchers’ rapid access to informational inputs required for their work.     15
statutory intellectual property protections, on the one hand, and on the other hand, legislative 
steps designed to reinforce the use of technologies of “self help” which enable copyright owners 
to more perfectly control the dissemination of digital content (whether legally protected or not). 
A second distinction has to be drawn between the situation of countries where legislative 
innovations affecting intellectual property may be under consideration, and those cases in which 
such statutes already are faits accomplis – so that the questions of practical interest concern 
implementation and enforcement. 
 
For most of the nations of the world, the appropriate recommendations in regard to both the 
technological and the legal measures that would restrict access to digital data used for research 
and training would seem to follow Nancy Reagan’s admonition to youths who are offered the 
opportunity to experiment with addictive drugs: “Just say ‘No’!” It is relevant that this option 
remains one that is open to all the countries, developed and developing alike, that are signatories 
to the TRIPS Agreement, and, of course to those who have not yet joined the WTO. To date, at 
least, there is no international convention in force for the legal protection of databases and the 
articles of the TRIPS Agreement do not pertain to database protection per se. Thus, unless a case 
were successfully to be made for interpreting the sui generis protections for databases created by 
the EC Directive of March 11, 1996 as somehow being covered under copyright, nothing in the 
TRIPS agreements would oblige other nations to follow the (misdirected) leaders in this 
particular regard. Such an interpretation, moreover, would be utterly tendentious in view of the 
numerous respects in which the terms of the EC Database Directive has been seen to deviate 
from the principles embraced by national and international copyright law. 
 
Much the same general position may be advanced in regard to the possible products of the 
legislative drive to provide legal reinforcement for technological measures of “self help” on the 
part of copyright owners. As has been noted (in section 4, above), the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (1998) includes language making it illegal to furnish – whether by importation or 
manufacture, and whether by sale or free distribution – all means of circumventing “any 
technological measure that effectively controls access” to a copyrighted work. As dubious, and 
in some respects as counter-productive as these sections of the DMCA have been found to be, by    16
both legal and technical experts,
13 it remains quite conceivable that an effort will be made to 
press other countries into following suit. In an immediate sense, however the issue in this case is 
not one of legal principle, but instead belongs to the wider and unresolved debate about the 
feasibility and desirability of uniform international standards of enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
Nothing presently compels countries that are signatory to the TRIPS Agreement to arrive at 
uniformity in the degree of enforcement of their intellectual property laws. It is true that the 
international conventions and laws governing patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, 
industrial designs, semiconductor mask works, and still other protections, all must be 
“effectively implemented and enforced” by each of the nations belonging to the WTO. 
Nevertheless, the term “effectively” remains subject to considerable variations in interpretation.
14 
In addition, the Agreement explicitly recognizes several bases for exemptions from the 
provisions made for protection of the rights of owners of intellectual property, including appeal 
to “fair use” or “public interest” (Articles 13, 17, 24, 27: 2, 30 and 37). It may be argued, 
therefore, that inasmuch as national governments under the Agreement retain the right to create a 
haven for “fair use” of protected intellectual property in the public interest, their ability to 
effectively exercise that right would be impeded by requiring that they prevent their own 
nationals from circumventing unilaterally imposed access blocking technologies in order to avail 
themselves of those “fair use” exemptions for those very same scientific research and training 
purposes.  
 
 The preceding remarks obviously apply to the situation in which the developing economies find 
themselves with respect to intellectual property protections that would have seriously inhibited 
worthy, “public interest” activities, had not the latter gained statutory exemptions under the laws’ 
provisos for “fair use.” It remains an interesting question as to whether it sphere of applicability 
                                                            
13 On the question of “counter-productive” effects, Dam (1998) notes the testimony by cyptography experts to the 
effect that the wording of the 1998 DMCA (US Code, 17, §1201) would make it illegal even to devise and distribute 
algorithms used in testing encryption systems by trying to defeat them., and, more generally would greatly impede 
research aimed at making such devices cheap and faster to apply. This point nicely recapitulates the larger theme, 
viz. that the would-be protectors of technological innovation frequently fail to grasp that information is an input in 
the process of generating new knowledge. 
  
14 See Reichman (1998) on the interpretation of the enforcement articles included in Part III of the TRIPS    17
extends still farther: could it also encompass retroactive remedial legislative actions on the part 
of the economically advanced member states of the EU that have not yet implemented the EC 
Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases in their national laws? Whereas some countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, were quick to implement the Directive without entering any 
exceptions or liberalizing interpretations, other European states, such as the Netherlands as well 
as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, have not rushed to comply with its terms. This has 
opened a window for attempts to modify the Directive’s force by suitable interpretations in the 
way it is implemented. But, rather than leaving it to individual members to undertake to 
ameliorate the harm that a literal acceptance and enforcement of the text of the Directive might 
do to the scientific research community in Europe, it would be far more satisfactory for the EC to 
now propose a “harmonized” set of fair use exemptions, as a minimal remedial step. 
 
That solution, however, is not likely to emerge spontaneously, not even in the wake of the 
departure of EC Commissioner Bangemann, and the scandal-prompted reforms undertaken by 
the new leadership of EC President Romano Prodi; some very considerable amount of political 
pressure would have to be brought to bear upon the Commission, and a coalition formed among 
the smaller member states who have yet to implement the Directive would seem to be among the 
few plausible ways in which such pressure could materialize. Yet, in view of the politically 
fragmented condition of Europe’s basic science research communities, the prospects of an 
effective coalition emerging would remain rather remote unless it were to be energized by 
business corporations similar to those in the US who have lobbied actively against counterpart 
database legislation. The political economy of the question, therefore, is likely to turn not upon 
the longer-run implications for science and technology in Europe as the logic of economic 
analysis might dictate; but instead upon whether or not there exists a significant section of 
European industry that comes to perceive a direct and immediate source of harm to their 
economic fortunes, in the extraordinary nature of the protections allowed by the EC’s Database 
Directive.  
  
According to the American writer and wit, Mark Twain, “the man who would rid the world of a 
cancer is not obliged to put something in its place.” Nevertheless, the reality of the situation is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Agreement, and the survey of implementation issues in Keely (2000).     18
that in the wake of the EC initiative to legally protect databases, regardless of whether or not 
there was empirical evidence to suggest that such measures were required for the growth of the 
database industry in Europe, this particular protection genie has got out of the bottle and won’t 
be stuffed completely back in. What this means is that remediation cannot simply take the form 
of a return to the status quo ante. As some alternative recommendations for intellectual property 
protection in the market for scientific databases are in order, I should not conclude the discussion 
without considering these, however briefly. 
 
In the view of most economists, the “first best” allocation system in situations where goods are 
produced with high fixed costs but far lower marginal costs, is to apply what is known as the 
“Ramsey pricing” rule. This fits the case of information products such as scientific publication 
and data, where the first-copy costs are very great in relationship to the negligible unit costs of 
copies. Ramsey pricing in essence amounts to price discrimination between users whose 
demands are inelastic and those users for whom the quantity purchased is extremely price-
sensitive. The former class of buyers therefore will bear high prices without curtailing the 
quantity purchased of the goods in question, and hence not suffer great reductions in 
consumption utility on that account, whereas the low prices offered to those in the second 
category will spare them the burden of economic welfare reducing cutbacks in their use of the 
good.  
 
The case might then be made for treating scholars and public sector, university-based researchers 
as having highly elastic information and data demands. Such a characterization would follow 
from considering that this category of knowledge-workers is employed on projects that have 
fixed budget allocations from public (or non-profit) entities, organizations that are expected to 
promote the interests of society at large. Since there is strong complementarity between their 
data and information requirements, on the one hand, and on the other resources they use in their 
research, the effects of raising the real price of this input are tantamount to sharply reducing the 
quantity of useful work that such projects can accomplish so long as their budgets remain fixed. 
Obviously, there is no workable economic or political mechanism that would serve to “index” 
the nominal value of public research budgets on the prices of commercially provided data. Even 
were such mechanisms to be found, commitment to implement them on the part of the rich    19
societies would most likely result in pricing the use of scientific information and data beyond the 
reach of many poorer societies. The general conclusion of this line of reasoning is simple: 
statutes that would establish legal ownership rights for compilers of scientific and technological 
databases also should include provisions mandating compulsory licensing of scientific database 
contents at marginal costs (of data extraction and distribution) to accredited individuals and 
research institutions.  
 
Of course, a second-best version of such a policy would be to grant researchers (and educators) 
broad “fair use” exemptions from the legal enforcement of database owner’s rights, dispensing 
with recovery of marginal costs except where special, value-adding facilities were used to extract 
the contents from protected databases. One reason against dispensing entirely with marginal cost 
charges is that it may well be the case that marginal extraction and copying costs might be lower 
for the database owner than for the research user, but, in the absence of quoted prices for the 
service, research groups may not be aware of this and so waste time and resources in performing 
tasks that could be more efficiently undertaken by the commercial database firm. In other words, 
allowing users to “do it for themselves” could deny both parties the benefits of the economies of 
scale and scope as were available. On the other side of the argument, it would be desirable to 
limit the incentives for database producers to bundle unwanted and costly extraction and 
reproduction services with the contents of their database, including services whose costs cannot 
be readily established and which give rise to opportunities for cross-subsidization among 
different classes of users.  
 
Compulsory licensing has further attractions as a remedy in this context. No protections are 
provided in the 1996 Database Directive against the abusive exploitation of market power arising 
in cases of sole supply of data; or where high set-up costs tend to preclude competitive entry into 
niche markets already occupied by early commercial database generators. The obvious remedy 
here would be to stipulate conditions (derived in accord with the principles underlying existing 
competition laws) that would trigger the “regulatory” imposition of compulsory licensing of 
database contents at the marginal costs of data provision. Such provisions would not be 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement, Part II of which (under Article 40) sets out conditions    20
under which anti-competitive licensing practices that are shown to prevent dissemination of a 
technology may be restricted.
15  
 
But the foregoing modest proposals are just the beginning of what must become a more intense 
discussion, involving participants drawn from many disciplines in the sciences, legal scholars 
and business lawyers, representatives of the affected industries and policy-makers from the 
developed and developing countries alike. There is much to do to protect the vitality of the 
global science system of open collaboration, and the time to do it has become short.  
                                                            
15 See Keely (2000), pp.6-7.    21
 
 
Table 1: Performance of US Database Industry after the 1991 Decision  
in Feist v. Rural Telephone 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Performance  indicators    1991   1997   %  change 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Number  of  databases     7637   10338     35% 
 
Number of files within 
 databases  (billions)        4.0     11.2   180% 
 
Number of online 
 searches (millions)         44.4     (88.1)    98% 
 
Private sector’s share in 
  number of databases*    0.70     0.78 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: * The private sector’s share in 1977 was 0.22. 
Source: http://www.databasedata.org/hr1858/legalprt/hegalprt.html.      22
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Figure 2. A Primer on the Economics of Knowledge 
 
 
•  Research outputs are information 
•  Information is a key research input, too 
•  Information is not a normal (private) commodity 
•  Two properties of “pure public goods”:  
!"“infinite expansabilty,” i.e., negligible marginal transfer costs 
!"Significant costs of exclusion from access and ‘possession’ 
!"High fixed costs of production 
•  Implications: 
!"Competitive markets fail to allocate ‘public goods’ efficiently 
!"‘mc pricing’ leaves most costs uncovered, even at large scales 
!"external use benefits not properly valued by private willingness 
 to pay 
 
 




Economic Virtues and Vices of Copyright Protection 
 
Analytical justification: Copyright protection addresses 
the problem of high fixed (first copy) cost and low 
marginal (added copy) cost. 
Virtues: 
♦  Incentives for creative productions 
♦  Reward for derivative innovation benefit s (‘droite 
de suivre’ principle rewards bias towards 
breadth/development potential) 
♦  ‘Versioning’ permits price discrimination based on 
urgency of demand for information 
Vices: 
♦  ‘Deadweight’ burden of monopoly, heavy for 
‘minority taste’ users 
♦  ‘Super-inefficiencies’ when applied to network 
goods (especially compatibility standards, interface 
standards) 
♦  Impediments to cumulative innovation, unless 
mitigated by ‘fair use’ exclusions 
♦  Inhibits development of modular system innovation 
(e.g., software system design)  









Figure 4a. “The Three P’s” and the Mix of Solutio
to the Knowledge-Appropriation Problem













Figure 5. The Digital Technology Boomerang 
(A schematic for getting ‘a surprise knock on the head’) 
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